Introduction
Optimization problems in vector spaces constitute convenient models of various applied problems in control theory, game theory, stochastic optimization and many other areas. There are, however, well-known difficulties associated with constraints having values in infinite-dimensional spaces: constraint qualification conditions are often in conflict with the desire to have an easy representation of Lagrange multipliers. This occurs, for example, in the optimal control theory [4, 7] and in stochastic programming [12, 18, 19, 6] . Numerical solution of such problems (or their finite-dimensional approximations), usually poses a great challenge, and much efforts are devoted to the ways of dealing with infinite-dimensional constraints. Our objective is to show a new possibility to drastically reduce the complexity of such optimization problems: aggregation of constraints to one or finitely many scalar equations or inequalities. Together with an abstract theory we shall present some applications of the new approach to control, games and stochastic programming. All of them, with a single exception, are concerned with convex optimization problems in Hilbert spaces; in the exceptional case (a game problem in section 6) we operate in the space dual to the space of continuous functions. In order to cover both situations with minimum generality (generality and complexity are not our aims in this paper), we describe the method in the context of convex optimization in a space that is dual to a separable Banach space.
The idea of aggregation was inspired by the extremal shift control principle used in differential games [9] . In the context of finite-dimensional optimization it has been developed in [10, 5] . In [11] a relevant approximate solution method for linear optimal control was analyzed.
We give the problem setting in the next section, in which we also decribe some useful schemes of establishing weak * convergence of approximate solutions to the solution set. Section 3 is devoted to the description of the abstract constraint aggregation method, and to the convergence analysis. The next two sections, 4 and 5, apply the method to optimal control problems. In section 6 we consider an application to game theory, and section 7 discusses an application to multistage stochastic programming.
Throughout, we write · for the norm in a Banach space Ξ and ·, · for the duality between Ξ and Ξ * ( g, x is the value of the functional x ∈ Ξ * at the element g ∈ Ξ).
In particular, if Ξ is a Hilbert space, ·, · stands for the scalar product in Ξ. The same notation will be used for the norm and scalar product in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space.
Problem setting. Preliminaries
Let Ξ be a separable Banach space, and let X = Ξ * be its dual. Let X be a closed bounded set in the space X and let f be a convex weakly * lower semicontinuous functional on X . We consider the minimization problem min f (x), (2.1)
2)
h(s, x) ≤ 0 for µ-a.a. s ∈ S (2.3)
Here A is a linear operator from X to some Hilbert space H, and b is a fixed element in H. We assume that x → Ax − b 2 is weakly * lower semicontinuous. The functionals h(s, ·), s ∈ S, are assumed to be convex and weakly * lower semicontinuous on X, and the parameter set S is a measurable space with a σ-additive measure µ. Furthermore, we assume that for each x ∈ X the functions s → h(s, x) are µ-measurable, and there exists a µ-measurable function h : S → R such that |h(s, x)| ≤ h(s) for all x ∈ X, s ∈ S, and S (h(s)) 2 µ(ds) < ∞. (2.5)
Finally, we assume that the feasible set of the problem (2.1)-(2.4) is nonempty.
Since the unit ball in X is weakly * compact [8, Thm. 6, p. 179] , and the set X is weakly * closed, the latter set is weakly * compact. Moreover, due to the weak * lower semicontinuity of x → Ax − b 2 and h(s, ·) ( s ∈ S ), the feasible set of (2.1)-(2.4) is weakly * compact. By assumption, the objective function f is weakly * lower semicontinuous. Therefore the problem (2.1)-(2.4) has a nonempty solution set X * . We denote by f * the minimum value: f * = f (x), x ∈ X * .
Remark 2.1. If X is a Hilbert space, we as usual identify Ξ with X = Ξ * , and the weak and is said to weakly * converge to Y if for every finite set of elements g 1 , . . ., g m ∈ Ξ one has inf
The convergence analysis of the methods discussed in the paper will be based on the following simple observations. Lemma 2.1. If a sequence {x k } ⊂ X satisfies the conditions
then {x k } weakly * converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.6).
Proof. We use standard arguments. Suppose the contrary. Then there is a subsequence
Since X is weakly * compact in X , with no loss of generality we may assume that {x k i } weakly * converges to some x ′ ∈ X. Hence (2.8) implies f (x ′ ) ≤ f * . The weak * lower semicontinuity of x → Ax − b 2 and (2.9) yield Ax ′ = b. Consequently, x ′ ∈ X * . Setting x = x ′ in (2.10), we arrive at a contradiction.
For the problem (2.7) the convergence scheme differs only in the details. For each x ∈ X and s ∈ S we define h + (s, x) = max(0, h(s, x)).
Lemma 2.2. If a sequence {x k } ⊂ X satisfies condition (2.8) and
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2.1. Only at the end (instead of Ax ′ = b) we need to show that
To this end we notice that the functionals x → (h + (s, x)) 2 are weakly * lower semicontinuous. This combined with (2.11) and (2.5) implies that
which completes the proof.
Combining the proofs of Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 one easily obtains a formulation for the problem (2.1)-(2.4) with both equality and inequality constraints. Lemma 2.3. Let a sequence {x k } from X satisfy (2.8), (2.9), and (2.11). Then {x k } weakly * converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.1)-(2.4).
We will separate the case where functional f is strongly convex, that is, there exists κ > 0 such that for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and β ∈ [0, 1] one has
Lemma 2.4. Let f be strongly convex and a sequence {x k } in X satisfy (2.8), (2.9), and (2.11). Then the solution set X * contains only one element, and {x k } strongly converges to X * .
Proof. The strong convexity of f obviously implies that X * is a singleton: X * = {x * }. Let us show that {x k } strongly converges to x * . Suppose the contrary, i.e., that there is a subsequence {x k i } such that
With no loss of generality, we may assume that {x k i } weakly * converges in X to some x ′ ∈ X. By (2.8), (2.9), and (2.11), x ′ is feasible in the problem (2.1)-(2.4) and f (x ′ = f * . Therefore, x ′ = x * . The next argument is close to [22] . Obviously, the sequence {(x k i + x * )/2} weakly * converges to x * . Due to the weak * lower semicontinuity of f ,
On the other hand, by the convexity of f
By (2.12) with β = 1/2
and (2.8) yields lim i→∞ x k i − x * 2 = 0. A contradiction with (2.13) completes the proof.
Constraint aggregation
Here we extend the finite-dimensional constraint aggregation method of [5] to the problem (2.1)-(2.4). We start from the problem (2.6) with the equality constraint. Let us fix x 0 ∈ X such that f (x 0 ) ≤ f * (in particular, x 0 may be a minimizer of f over X), and define a sequence {x k } of approximate solutions to (2.1)-(2.4) by
where u k is a solution of:
2)
4)
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Theorem 3.1. The sequence {x k } generated by (3.1)-(3.5) weakly * converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.6).
Proof. It is sufficient to verify the properties (2.8), (2.9). One verifies them using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [5] . The first one is obvious, because the subproblem (3.2)-(3.4) is a relaxation of (2.6), so f (u k ) ≤ f * . By the convexity of f we have f (
To prove the second one we use (3.3) to obtain the key inequality:
where K A is an upper bound on Ax − b 2 in X. Therefore
This proves (2.9).
For the problem (2.7) with inequality constraints we modify the algorithm by replacing 9) and by using the corresponding stepsize rule
Theorem 3.2. The sequence (x k ) generated by (3.1), (3.7)-(3.9) and (3.10) weakly converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.7).
Proof. By Lemma 2.2 it is sufficient to verify properties (2.8), (2.11) . We follow the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [5] .
For each s ∈ S, by the convexity of h(s, ·),
In the above inequality, for the parameter values s for which the left hand side is positive, the right hand side has a larger absolute value. Therefore
where in the last inequality we used (3.8). The rest is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Finally, for the problem (2.1)-(2.4) with both equality and inequality constraints, the algorithm combines (3.2)-(3.4) and (3.7)-(3.9). The subproblem takes on the form min f (u), (3.11) 14) and the stepsize rule is modified accordingly:
where the scaling factor γ > 0.
Theorem 3.3. The sequence {x k } generated by (3.1), (3.11)-(3.14) and (3.15) weakly * converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.1)-(2.4).
The proof is identical. Let us point out a modification of the constraint aggregation method, in which the inequality (3.13) is replaced by a more general constraint. Namely, consider the auxiliary problem min f (u), (3.16)
Here g k (·) is a scalar function on X such that for every 20) and for every u feasible in the original problem (2.1)-(2.4) inequality (3.18) is satisfied. 
4).
The proof is identical.
Remark 3.1. It also clear from the analysis that the aggregate inequality constraints (3.12) can be replaced by equations. It is also possible to aggregate constraints in subgroups, analogously to the two groups (3.12) and (3.14) in the last case. The stepsize rule has to be then modified in a corresponding way, similarly to (3.15) . The detailed description of these technical details and the convergence proof will be omitted, because they are obvious at this stage.
Remark 3.2. By virtue of Lemma 2.4 in all the above results the convergence of {x k } to X * is strong if the functional f is strongly convex.
Optimal control of linear systems
In this section we employ the constraint aggregation technique to solve a problem of optimal control for a linear system, under mixed constraints on state and control variables. The problem formulation is as follows:
C and D are n × n and n × m matrices, respectively, y 0 ∈ R n , and M is a convex compactum in R n × R n . The constraint (4.4) (which does not carry information on the classes of functions y and v) is formally understood as Remark 4.1. The solution method described below works in a more general setting. The system equation (4.2) may be nonstationary and nonhomogeneous, that is, C and D may be bounded measurable matrix functions of time t, and the right hand side of (4.2) may contain an additional measurable time-dependent term. Also the set M in (4.6) may be a bounded measurable map with compact and convex values. Finally, the function ϕ in (4.5) may be only bounded and measurable in t. Wishing to avoid unnecessary technical details, we concentrate on the simplest case (4.1)-(4.4).
We shall reduce the optimal control problem (4.1)-(4.4) to a convex optimization problem (2.6) with linear constraints. Define the spaces:
. Thus, we treat arguments (y, v) of problem (4.1)-(4.4) as elements of the Hilbert space X . Let us rewrite the equation (4.2) in an integral form:
In a more general notation it reads
Here A is a linear bounded operator from X to H given by
and
The set (4.6) is naturally transformed into
Obviously, X is closed, convex and bounded in X . Thus the optimization problem (2.6) where the operator A, element b and set X are given by (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) satisfies all the assumptions of section 3, and can be solved with the constraint aggregation method described in Theorem 3.1.
The next reduction theorem is evident.
Theorem 4.1. Let the operator A : X → H, the element b ∈ H and the set X ⊂ X be defined by (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9). Then the optimal control problem (4.1)-(4.4) is equivalent to the convex optimization problem (2.6) in the following sense:
In the remaining part of this section the convex optimization problem (2.6) is understood as described in Theorem 4.1. Its solution set will be denoted by X * ; for the solution set of the optimal control problem (4.1)-(4.4) we will use the notation Ω * . To solve the problem (2.6) we employ the constraint aggregation method (3.1)-(3.5) (see Theorem 3.1).
We shall specify u k in (3.2)-(3.4) in terms of a certain optimal control problem. We start with a specification of the term
Referring to (4.7), for u = (z, w) ∈ X we have 12) where T denotes the transposition, we obtain
and let
We arrive at the following specification of (3.2), (3.4):
To sum up, we describe the constraint aggregation algorithm as follows.
Step
Step k. .12) and calculate the bound η 1 (4.14). (ii) Find measurable functions (z k , w k ) which constitute the optimal controls in the problem (4.15)-(4.18).
and the stepsize
Note that r k ⊥ ρ k by (4.13) and (4.17). (iv) Form the (k + 1)th approximate solution
Let us call the above algorithm the constraint aggregation algorithm for problem (4.1)-(4.4) . The following convergence theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.2. The sequence {(y k , v k )} generated by the constraint aggregation algorithm for problem (4.1)-(4.4)
) to the solution set Ω * of this problem; and (ii) strongly converges in X to Ω * if the functional f is strongly convex. 
A typical example is ϕ(t, y, v) = ϕ 0 (t, y, v)
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We have already shown that the sequence {x k } = {(y k , v k )} is constructed via a specification of the constraint aggregation method (3.1), (3.2)-(3.4) of section 3. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, this sequence weakly converges to the solution set X * of the problem (2.6), and, by Remark 3.2, strongly converges to X * , if the functional f is strongly convex. Since the problem (2.6) is equvalent to (4.1)-(4.4), as stated in Theorem 4.1, the proof is complete.
Let us consider stronger types of convergence of sequences of form {ȳ
to Ω * converges to zero, and Y-weakly converges to
where · c stands for the norm in C([0, 1], R n ). These types of convergence hold for the functionsȳ k defined as the solutions to the Cauchy problemṡ
Adding the computation ofȳ k to Step k of the above algorithm we define the modified constraint aggregation algorithm for the problem (4.1)-(4.4).
Remark 4.3. Note that for the sequence {(y k ,ȳ k , v k )} formed by this algorithm for the problem (4.1)-(4.4), the sequence {(ȳ k , v k )} is a sequence of control processes [14] , i.e., for each k the functionȳ k is the trajectory of the system (4.2) corresponding to the control v k .
To formulate the result, we need the next definition. A functional f will be called uniformly strongly convex in control if there exists κ > 0 such that for all y ∈ C([0, 1], R n ),
) and β ∈ [0, 1], the following inequality holds Proof. Let us prove (i) by contradiction. Suppose that {(ȳ k , v k )} is not Y-weakly convergent to Ω * . Then there is a subsequence {(y
Since the set X given by (4.9) (closed and bounded in X ) is weakly compact in X and the sequence {ȳ
) (of equicontinuous functions), with no loss of generality we may assume that This implies in particular that the equality constraint A(y * , v * ) = b in problem (2.6) is satisfied. Referring to the definitions (4.7), (4.8) of the operator A and the element b, we specify:
where y * * is the solution to the Cauchy probleṁ
On the other hand, the weak convergence (4.23) and the fact thatȳ k are solutions to the Cauchy problems (4.20) imply thatȳ
Consequently,ȳ * = y * * and, by (4.27),ȳ * (θ) = y * (θ) for a.a. θ ∈ [0, 1]. These facts together with (4.26) imply by Theorem 4.1 that (ȳ * , v * ) ∈ Ω * , which contradicts (4.25).
Let us now prove (ii). Suppose this is not true, i.e., there is a subsequence {ȳ
As above, with no loss of generality we assume that the relations (4.22), (4.23), (4.24) take place. Thus (ȳ * , v * ) ∈ Ω * . To complete the proof by contradiction with (4.28) it is sufficient to show that
Relations (4.24), (4.23), the weak lower semicontinuity of f : X → R and the fact that
The continuity of ϕ and the convergence (4.24) imply
The last relation, by virtue of the strong convexity of the functional v → f (ȳ * , v), guarantees the convergence (4.29), which contradicts (4.28).
Let us end this section with some observations concerning the auxiliary problem (4.15)-(4.18) that needs to be solved at each iteration of the method. Both direction vectors, z k and w k , which correspond to the state trajectory and the control function in the original problem, are control functions in the auxiliary problem. Therefore the constraints (4.18) in the auxiliary problem apply only to the controls. Moreover, the state equation (4.16) is one-dimensional, and particularly simple, because the 'aggregate state' does not appear at the right hand side. We shall show how these features can be exploited in solving (4.15)-(4.18).
Using the standard terminology of control theory (see [14] ), we call pairs (y, z) ∈ Ω satisfying (4.2) and (4.3) control processes. Notation intM will stand for the interior of M . 
and the map (λ, t) → (z k (λ, t), w k (λ, t)) is continuous; (ii) There exists λ k such that
Proof. Assertion (i) follows from the strict convexity of ϕ(t, ·, ·). To prove (ii) suppose that (4.31) is not satisfied for λ k = 0, for example,
(the opposite inequality is treated similarly). For the control process ( y, v) we have
, where ε > 0. Since ( y(t), v(t)) ∈ intM for all t ∈ [0, 1], we have (z k ε (t), w k ε (t)) ∈ M for all t ∈ [0, 1], if ε > 0 is sufficiently small. In view of (4.32) and (4.33),
Therefore, the minimum value in the problem
is smaller than η k 1 − δ with some positive δ. Hence, the minimum value in the perturbed problem
is smaller than η k 1 − δ/2, provided α > 0 is sufficiently small. In the latter problem,
is obviously a minimizer. Setting α so small that α f (z, w) < δ/2 for all (z, w) ∈ Ω, we get
Since the map (λ, t) → (z k (λ, t), w k (λ, t)) is continuous, (4.34) and (4.32) yield (4.31) for some λ k ∈ (0, 1/α). The equality (4.31) shows that (z k (λ k , ·), w k (λ k , ·)) is feasible in the problem (5.19)-(5.24). For every (z, w) feasible in this problem we have
Remark 4.5. Lemma 4.1 shows that if the solutions (z k (λ, t), w k (λ, t)) of the finitedimensional problems (4.30) are given explicitly, then the major operation in the constraint aggregation algorithm (Step k, (ii)) is reduced to an one-dimensional algebraic equation (4.31). For example, for a linear-quadratic integrand
(α > 0, β > 0) and with box constraints
where [ · ]
u l denotes the orthogonal projection on the box [l, u]. These formulae can be substituted into the algebraic equation (4.31).
In this section, we solve a more complicated problem of optimal control employing the constraint aggregation method specialized for both equality and inequality constraints. Instead of a linear control system (4.1)-(4.4), we treat a more general convex process described by a differential inclusion with a convex graph (see [2] ). The problem formulation is as follows: min f (y) (5.1)
Here F is a (set-valued) map from R n into the set of all nonempty convex compacta in
In (5.5) M is a convex compactum in R n × R n . The function ϕ in (5.6) is continuous, and
Let us return to the set-valued map F . Let M 0 = {y ∈ R n : (y, v) ∈ M }. We assume that the set-valued map y → F (y) has a convex graph on M 0 , i.e. for every
Remark 5.1. Let F be determined through the velocity sets of the linear control system (4.2), i.e. F (x) = {Cx + Dv : v ∈ V } where V is a convex compactum in R m . Then F has a convex graph on M 0 .
Remark 5.2. The fact that F has a convex graph on M 0 implies that F is continuous on M 0 .
We assume that the feasible set of problem (5.1)-(5.4) is nonempty.
Remark 5.3. The solution method described below works in a more general situation where F and M are nonstationary, measurably dependent on time. We however focus on the simplest case.
We first reduce problem (5.1)-(5.4) to a convex optimization problem of the form (2.1)-(2.4) with equality and inequality constraints. Let us rewrite (5.2) in an integral form:
where
The latter is equivalent to the system of inequalities s, v(t) ≤ ρ(s, F (y(t))) for s ∈ Σ n−1 , and a.a. (see [16] ). For reasons that will become clear later, it is convenient to consider on Σ n−1 a measure ν proportional to the Lebesgue measure and such that ν(Σ n−1 ) = 1. Since s → ρ(s, F (y)) is continuous, (5.8) is equivalent to
where a.a. is understood with respect to the product of the measure ν on Σ n−1 and the Lebesgue measure on
, and
Treating the functions y and v as elements of X , we may rewrite (5.7),
Here A is a linear bounded operator from X to H given by F (y) ), y ∈ M 0 , is equicontinuous. This and the continuity of ρ(s, F (·)) following from Remark 5.2 imply that the function (s, y) → ρ(s, F (y)) is continuous on Σ n−1 ×M 0 . Therefore, for each (y, v) ∈ X the function (s, t) → ρ(s, F (y(t))) is bounded and measurable. We conclude that for each (y, v) ∈ X the function (s, t) → h(s, t, y, v) together with (s, t) → h + (s, t, y, v) = max{h(s, t, y, v), 0}, belong to the space L The theorem is obvious.
In the rest of this section the convex optimization problem (2.1)-(2.4) is understood as described in Theorem 5.1. Its solution set will be denoted by X * ; for the solution set of the initial problem (5.1)-(5.4) we shall use the notation Ω * . For solving problem (2.1)-(2.4) we employ the constraint aggregation method (3.1), (3.11)-(3.14) and (3.15) of section 2 (see Theorem 3.3). We shall first specify u k in (3.11)-(3.14). Let (3.12) , where u = (z, w) ∈ X , has the form
We obtain this arguing like in the previous section (with C = 0 and D equal to the identity matrix). The integral in the constraint (3.13) has the form
We arrive at the following specification of (3.11), (3.14): u k = (z k , w k ) is an optimal control in the problem
The constraint aggregation algorithm (3.1), (3.11)-(3.14). (3.15) can be summarized as follows.
Step 0. Fix (y 0 , v 0 ) ∈ X such that 1 0 ϕ(t, y(t), v(t)) dt ≤ f * (in particular, (y 0 , v 0 ) may be the minimizer of the objective functional in X).
Step k. 
Let us call the above algorithm the constraint aggregation algorithm for problem (5.1)-(5.4) .
) to the solution set Ω * of this problem; and (ii) strongly converges in X to Ω * if the functional f is strongly convex.
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is identical to that of Theorem 4.2. Here, instead of Theorem 3.1, we refer to Theorem 3.3 and use the reduction Theorem 5.1.
There are intriguing connections of the method just described with Steiner selections of convex maps. We shall use them to develop a modified constraint aggregation method for convex processes.
Recall that the Steiner point of a convex compact set B ⊂ R n is defined as
where ν is a uniform measure on Σ n−1 satisfying ν(Σ n−1 ) = 1, and ρ(·, B) is the support function of B (see [21] and [20, §3.4 
]).
Let us define the mappings:
It is evident that
Therefore the first component of the inner integral at the right side of (5.17) can be transformed as follows:
Consider the second component of the inner integral in the right hand side of (5.17). We have
In view of (5.25), the expression (5.17) can be estimated as follows:
We see that the estimate ϕ(t, z(t), w(t)) dt,
Let us call the above algorithm the Steiner constraint aggregation algorithm for problem the following inequality holds
and The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.3. An identical modification and result are possible also for the Steiner constraint aggregation method.
Games
Let us now consider a zero-sum game defined as follows. There are compact sets S ⊂ R n and T ⊂ R m , which we shall call sets of pure strategies of players A and B, respectively. The payoff function r : S × T → R assigns to each pair of pure strategies (s, t) the amount that A has to pay B. We assume that r is continuous. A mixed strategy of A is a probability measure µ on S; similarly, a mixed strategy of B is a probability measure ν on T (see [1, §3.1.6] ). The set of all probability measures on S, or T , will be denoted Π(S) and Π(T ), respectively. For each pair of mixed strategies (µ, ν) ∈ Π(S) × Π(T ) the expected payoff is given by
It is well-defined, because r is continuous.
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The problem is to find a saddle point of the game, that is, a pair of measures (µ
Such a saddle point exists [1, §7.7.2] . A symmetric game [13] is a game in which m = n, S = T , and the function r is skew-symmetric in the following sense: r(s, t) = −r(t, s), for all (s, t) ∈ S × S.
In a symmetric game, for each µ ∈ Π(S) we have R(µ, µ) = 0. In particular, this must hold for µ * and for ν * . Setting µ = ν * and ν = µ * in (6.2) we see that R(µ * , ν * ) = 0 and that it is sufficient to look for symmetric saddle points of form (µ * , µ * ). This simplifies (6.2) to the system of inequalities
Remark 6.1. Every zero-sum game with a payoff function r : S × T → R can be reduced to a symmetric game on (S × T ) × (S × T ), by defining a skew-symmetric payoff function
It is clear that every symmetric saddle point of this game corresponds to a saddle point in (6.2), and vice versa. Therefore we shall concentrate on symmetric games, to simplify the notation.
Let us reduce a symmetric game to a problem with inequality constraints of form (2.7). Define X = rca(S)-the linear space of all regular countably additive functions on the σ-algebra B of all Borel sets in S. We treat X as the space dual to the space Ξ of continuous functions g : S → R with the norm g = max s∈S |g(s)|.
We define f ≡ 0 and X = Π(S); the latter set is convex and weakly * compact in X (Prohorov's theorem, see [3] ).
Finally, we define the functional h : S × X → R by
It is linear with respect to µ and bounded, because r is continuous. Let us observe that the inequalities (6.3) can be equivalently expressed as
Due to the continuity of h(·, µ), the quantifier 'for all' can be replaced by 'for almost all with respect to the Lebesgue measure on S'. Moreover, the linear functionals h(t, ·), t ∈ S, given by (6.4), are weakly * continuous. With these definitions all assumptions of Section 3 are satisfied, and the problem of finding a saddle point of a symmetric game becomes an instance of the general formulation (2.7). Let us specify for it the method with constraint aggregation (3.1), (3.7)-(3.9) and (3.10). Denoting by µ k the current iterate (which corresponds to x k in section 3), we obtain from (6.4) the following specification of the left hand side of the aggregate constraint (3.8):
We arrive at the following subproblem: u k is a solution of the system S×S r(s, t)h
The next iterate µ k+1 is defined by
The next theorem is a simple consequence of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 6.1. Let the game have a skew-symmetric and continuous payoff function r :
S × S → R, where S is a compact set in R n . Then for every µ 0 ∈ Π(S) the sequence of probability measures {µ k } defined by (6.6)-(6.9) weakly converges to the set of probability measures µ * such that (µ * , µ * ) is a saddle point of the game.
Let us analyse in more detail the subproblem (6.6)-(6.7). Observe that due to the absence of any objective function (f ≡ 0), there is much freedom in specifying u k . We shall show that some solutions to (6.6)-(6.7) can be defined in a closed form.
One-step lookahead correction
Let us define
is not a solution of the game, i.e., if it does not satisfy (6.5), we have α k > 0. Thus we can define
that is, u k is a probability measure with the density h + (·, µ k )/α k . Since r is skew-symmetric, in (6.6) we have
Consequently, the measure (6.10) is a solution of (6.6)-(6.7). We shall call it a one-step lookahead correction, because u k is a good B's response to the strategy µ k employed by A:
The step (6.8) can be thus interpreted as combining µ k with a strategy u k that beats µ k . It bears some similarity with the method of fictious play of [15] , but our correction is a mixed strategy rather than pure, and we employ the minimizing stepsize (6.9) instead of τ k = 1/(k + 1).
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More generally, we may interpret the aggregate constraint (6.6) as the requirement that u k be a sufficient response to the one-step lookahead strategy having the density α −1 k h + (·, µ k ). Indeed, subject to a normalizing constant, inequality (6.6) requires that the payoff of the game be non-positive. This allows us to consider other candidates for u k .
Two-step lookahead correction
Let us define for s ∈ S λ k (s) = This means that the strategy ν(dt) = α −1 k h + (t, µ k )dt provides a nonegative payoff for B, irrespective of A's strategy, that is, ν is a solution of the game.
If this is not the case, we must have γ k = S λ k − (s) ds > 0. Consequently, we may define the probability measure (6.11) to guarantee that (6.6) is satisfied as a strict inequality S×S r(s, t)h
Let us observe that the measure (6.11) is a good response of Player A to the strategy (6.10) applied by B. Therefore we shall call it a two-step lookahead correction.
Stochastic programming
Let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space, and let {F t }, t = 1, . . ., T be a filtration in F . A sequence of random variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x T ), where x t : Ω → R nt , n t > 0, will be called a policy. We consider only policies that have a bounded variance and we define the decision space
It is a Hilbert space with the scalar product
x, y X = T t=1 E x t , y t .
A policy is nonanticipative, if each x t is F t -measurable, t = 1, . . ., T (x is adapted to {F t }). It is evident that the set of all nonanticipative policies is a closed linear subspace of X ; it will be denoted M.
Let G be a map from Ω to the set of all subsets of R n (identified with R n 1 × · · ·× R n T ), where n = T t=1 n t . We assume that G is measurable, and that with probability one its value G(ω) is a nonempty convex compactum in R n . A policy x is called feasible, if
x(ω) ∈ G(ω) with probability 1.
(7.
The set of all feasible policies will be denoted X. It is convex, closed and bounded in X .
Finally, we have a functional f : X → R, defined as f (x) = E ϕ(x(ω), ω),
where ϕ : R n × Ω → R. We assume that ϕ(·, ω) is convex for P-almost all ω ∈ Ω, and ϕ(z, ·) is measurable for all z ∈ R n . Furthermore, we assume that there exists ε > 0 such that for all x such that inf y∈X x − y X < ε one has |ϕ(x(ω), ω)| ≤ ϕ(ω), with probability 1, and E ϕ < ∞. Then the functional (7.3) is convex and bounded in the ε-neighborhood of X. We see that all assumptions of Section 3 are satisfied.
The multistage stochastic programming problem is to minimize (7. 3) in the set of policies that are nonanticipative and feasible. Its optimal value, as before, will be denoted by f * . Following [17, 24] let us equivalently represent the nonanticipativity condition x ∈ M in a form of a linear constraint. Let E t denote the operation of conditional expectation with respect to the σ-subfield F t , t = 1, . . ., T . Directly from the definition of the conditional expectation, the nonanticipativity condition is equivalent to the equations x t = IE t x t a.s., for t = 1, . . . , T . This allows to formulate the multistage stochastic programming problem as a special case of (2.6):
min E ϕ(x(ω), ω), (7.4)
x t − E t x t = 0, t = 1, . . ., T, A t x t = x t − E t x t , t = 1, . . . , T.
Since Ax, x − Ax X = 0, it is clear that I − A is the orthogonal projection on M, and A-on the orthogonal complement M ⊥ . Therefore
